Do Women Pay More for New Vehicles? Evidence from Transaction Price Data
Recently, there has been a debate concerning whether price discrimination by new vehicle dealers results in systematically higher prices for minority and female buyers. Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman (1995) and Pinelopi Koujianoi Goldberg ( 1996) use different methodologies and different data sets and come to different conclusions. Ayres and Siegelman use testergenerated paired audits and find that black and female test buyers were quoted higher prices than white males. Goldberg uses Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) data and finds no systematic evidence of price discrimination in transaction price discounts by race or sex (but greater variation in discounts for blacks). Our paper contributes to the debate on price discrimination in new car purchases using a new J.D. Power and Associates database that reports gross profit directly from dealer financial software systems. Although our data set does not distinguish the race of the buyer, we do get direct-evidence on dealer vrofit for male and female buyers in a sample reflecting over 4,000 new vehicle transactions. Our paper addresses the previously obtained contradictory results and differs from the previous studies in several ways. The database we use permits us to measure directly dealers' self-reported gross profit per vehicle-the best measure of differential treatment. The database reflects contemporaneously collected dealer data: it comes from the same financial software programs that are used to automatically report data to the franchiser1 manufacturer, financial institutions, and motor vehicle bureaus as well as being used to calculate sales tax liabilities. Further, the data set allows us to test for price discrimination in the profit contributions of ancillary tie-ins such as service contracts. credit life insurance, and ' dealer residuals from financing the vehicle ~urchase.
In the Ayres and Siegelman study, black auditors received initial offers or negotiated prices that were much higher than those for the paired white male auditors at the same dealerships-$400 more for black females and $1,060 more for black males. White female auditors received offers or negotiated prices that were $55 to $129 more than those for white males, but the effect was not statistically significant. Ayres (1995) combined the s aired audit data with additional unpaired data gathered in the same study, and finds that final offers to white women were $216 higher than to white men and with a p-value (0.06) approaching conventional significance levels.
Under the audit technique no tester ever consummated a transaction so Ayres and Siegelman have no measure of vehicle profit from any sale. Goldberg (1996) argues that the offers obtained by the auditors do not reflect transaction prices in part because the protocol for the Ayres and Siegelman study called for auditors to adopt one of two bargaining strategies. Seller behavior should be different across classes of consumers if the classes have different demands (e.g., different variances of reservations prices) or different bargaining strategies. Goldberg maintains that since different classes of buyers may use different bargaining strategies, the offers obtained by the auditors reveal information about seller behavior but not about transaction prices. Goldberg (1996) uses CES data from 1983 to 1987 to test for price discrimination by new vehicle dealers. Controlling for a number of variables. she was unable to find reliable evidence that blacks or white females received smaller discounts on the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) than white males. The estimation results suggested that white females received discounts that were $1 30 smaller than those received by white males, but the effect was statistically insignificant. The Gold-berg study, however, is subject to several potential sources of bias. First, Goldberg uses discounts from the MSRP to measure differential treatment. While acknowledging that dealer markup on the vehicle would be the preferable measure, Goldberg argues that a specification that includes fixed effects for vehicle makes (Chevrolet, Buick, and so on) should lead to equivalent results for discounts from MSRP and dealer markup. But Dealer Markup = MSRP(1 -Cost Factor) -Discount, so this assertion holds only if dealer cost factors (the ratio of dealer wholesale cost to MSRP) are the same by make. Cost factors, however, vary substantially within a make and even within a model line by trim level. For example, in 1987 (the last year of the Goldberg sample) the Pontiac Fiero base model had a cost factor of 0.94, while the Pontiac Bonneville had a cost factor of 0.86 (Consumer Reports, 1987) . Hence, in the Goldberg specification the same absolute discount can represent a considerably different markup, an important consideration if different demographic groups choose vehicles within a make with different cost factors.
Second, problems with the CES sample force Goldberg to drop more than half of the potential observations. Observations are dropped if the vehicle model was unidentified because there were few observations for a particular make and dropped if there were missing or inconsistent responses for household and vehicle transaction variables. The vehicle transaction variables included price, trade-in allowance, down payment and principal (if the automobile was financed), make, model, and options. To be included in the final sample, a household member had to recall a substantial amount of detailed information. If meticulous record keepers are also the type that obtain higher discounts and meticulous record keeping is correlated with sex and/or race, then the discounts of different demographic groups in the Goldberg sample will not represent discounts in the general population.
Third, trim levels and options affect the MSRP of vehicles, but are not directly reported in the CES. To calculate the MSRP, Goldberg imputes the trim level from the major options reported in the CES, but even the imputation is incomplete and Goldberg sometimes assigns an MSRP based on a sales-weighted average MSRP over the trim levels for a model. Goldberg acknowledges these sources of measurement error and argues that model coefficients will be consistent if the errors are uncorrelated with the other regressors. But if women choose different trim levels or are less likely to purchase additional options, then the estimates in the Goldberg model will be biased.
I. A New Database of Dealer Profit Information
The question of whether price discrimination by new vehicle dealers results in women paying more for new vehicles has not been answered definitively. Two careful studies come to somewhat different conclusions, but both are subject to criticism. We help resolve the question of whether women pay more for new vehicles by using data from a J.D. Power & Associates database that avoids several weaknesses in the data used in the previous studies. We must acknowledge, however, that this database has its weaknesses as well. Before describing the database in detail we list the weaknesses. First, the database does not include the race of the buyer. Hence, omitted variable bias is possible. If black males pay more than black females (as suggested in Ayres and Siegelman) then our model will not be as likely to detect a difference in profit between men and women.' Second, to protect the privacy of dealers and customers, the database reports information in "cells" containing at least three transactions. Our data set contains information on 4,030 transactions, but these 4,030 transactions are grouped in 414 cells with the cells containing from three to 74 transactions. Hence, our results are subject to the problem of ecological correlation (the possibility of drawing incorrect conclusions about individual outcomes from aggregated data; see David A. Freedman, 2001 ), but the extent of this problem should be slight since the number of transactions per cell (median = 7) is quite small. Third, the J.D. Power database reports dealer information only for the approximately ' While blacks make up 12.7 percent of the U.S. population, the proportion of black new car buyers is considerably smaller. A marketing research company reports that in 1995 black households made up 4.8 percent of the total households who reported that they bought or leased a new vehicle in the last year (Mediamark Research, 1996) ; information derived from the CES suggests that in 1997 black households accounted for 7 percent of the total expenditures on new vehicles (U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1999).
2,300 dealers who have been recruited to be included in the system. We cannot claim that this represents a random sample of dealers. While acknowledging that the sample of dealers is not random, it is noteworthy that vehicle manufacturers find the information sufficiently valuable to pay tens of thousands of dollars a month for access to the database.
The Power Information Network (PIN), a division of J.D. Power and Associates, is an electronic-tracking database, which provides subscribers point-of-sale data for both new and used light vehicles. During the observation period for this study, February 2000, the data were gathered from over 2,300 dealers in ten markets throughout the United states2 PIN reports that an average of one-third of area dealers supply transactions data in the markets which they have entered. Participating new vehicle dealers record each sale on their own dealership finance and insurance (F&I) systems-based accounting system. Dealer transactions are uploaded nightly to PIN, where the data from the several different F&I systems are formatted into a single system and checked for clerical and reporting errors.
Through PIN we had access to self-recorded dealer gross profit on the vehicle sale (vehicle gross) and on sale of ancillaries (service contracts, credit life insurance, and finance reserve). We exclude all leases because many such transactions occur at a fixed advertised price. Vehicle gross is the dollar profit made by the dealer adjusting for the "overallowance" or "underallowance" on a used vehicle trade-in.3 'These market areas included Atlanta, Boston. Chicago, DallasIFt. Worth, Denver/Colorado Springs. Florida (Fort Lauderdale, Miami. Orlando, St. Petersburg, and Tampa), New York metro, northern California, southern California, and Philadelphia.
'The dealer recorded cash value (or book value) of the trade-in is not necessarily the same as the trade-in amount presented to the buyer; thus the importance of controlling for overallowances (trade-in amount > cash value of tradein) and underallowances (trade-in amount < cash value) in calculating vehicle gross. The cash value of the vehicle is based on the "blue" or "black book values given the trade-in vehicle's mileage and overall condition. In a typical dealership the appraisal of the cash value of the trade-in is made by the manager of the used vehicle profit center. Any, say, overallowance is not canied over to the used car profit center as the cost basis for the trade-in vehicle would be such that the used vehicle profit center would likely incur a loss. Calculation of profit contributions requires an accurate The vehicle gross also reflects profit from (1) factory-installed accessories and optional equipment, (2) dealer-installed accessories contracted for at the time of sale, and (3) dealer "holdback," "pack," gross payables, and "document fees." None of the vehicle lines in our data set had active factory-to-dealer incentive programs on 2000 model-year vehicles during our observation period (Automotive News, 2000); if they had existed, the rebate would have been included in vehicle gross if the dealer booked the incentive at the time of the sale. Dealers also may earn profit on the sale of extended warrantiesfservice contracts. When the customer finances the purchase through the dealer, the dealers can earn additional profit by financing the deal (finance reserve) and by selling credit life insurance which pays off the customer's loan if the customer dies prior to payoff. The finance reserve is the profit that the dealer makes by marking up the finance rate charged to the retail buyer compared to the wholesale rate from a lender; since loans may be prepaid or defaulted, a "reserve" account is established to track the realized profit from each loan.
To minimize markup differences that could result from differences in optional equipment on a vehicle, we choose vehicles and trim levels where most options are standard or where there is a single trim level. Generally, the highest trim level will include most options available for that vehicle line. By choosing higher trim levels we minimize, but do not eliminate, the possibility that our results are biased if men and women have differing tastes for options. The need to control in this manner for trim level affects the set of vehicles included in our sample: we chose vehicles which offered one or few trim levels (e.g., Acura 3.2TL, Chrysler 300M, Subaru Forester) over vehicles which had higher overall sales spread across many trim levels. The 30 modelftrim levels are listed in Table I along with the means and standard deviations for cash value so that. say, overallowances are taken as a discount off the contract price of the new vehicle in order to arrive at the correct vehicle gross for the new vehicle profit center. In the same way, profit stemming from an underallowance is credited to the new vehicle profit center. Hence, our vehicle gross measure should reflect price discrimination stemming from women receiving lower trade-in amounts. vehicle gross profit, service contract income, finance reserve, and life insurance income. Buyers are classified as female or male as determined by a PIN proprietary probabilistic name program. If there are two or more buyers, the sex of the first recorded purchaser is used; we assume in such cases that the first name listed indicates the person who took the lead in negotiations. Misclassification would bias our results against finding differences between male and female buyers. Increasing our confidence in the accuracy of classification of sex by name, however, is that in 20 percent of all transactions the name could not be unambiguously assigned to a sex (and these cases are excluded from our sample).
We control for several other aspects of the vehicle transaction as well. The age of the buyer is reported on the credit application. (Cash customers also report their age to the dealer.) If there are multiple buyers, the age of the buyer listed first is used. We obtained buyer age in ten-year intervals from age 20-29 to age 80-89, for a total of seven age categories (but later combined the age 70-79 and age 80-89 categories since there were relatively few 80-89-year-old buyers in the sample). We also control for the number of days vehicles were in inventory at the dealership ("days to turn"). Vehicles with sought-after attributes have fewer days in inventory. A vehicle having more days in inventory indicates that it is less desirable and the dealer may have to accept a lower vehicle gross. Finally, we measure the percentage of sales in which the annual percentage finance rate is less than 7 percent. Any transaction below this rate indicates manufacturer subvention (subsidy). (In such cases the dealers may still obtain a finance reserve through a fixed payment from the manufacturer.)
As indicated above, to protect the privacy of dealers and customers, individual transaction data is not revealed. Instead, information is available onlv if three or more transactions are contained in a particular cell. Potentially, we could have obtained information by sex of buyer (two types), type of sale (two types), and customer age category (seven categories) for each of the 30 modelltrim levels for a total of 840 possible cells. Instead we have data for 4 14 cells because there were less than three transactions in the remaining 426 cells. The empty cells appear in a predictable pattern. For the Buick Century, all cells are filled in the four age categories for those 50 and over, but only one cell (out of eight) is filled for 20-and 30-yearolds. For the several sport utility vehicles included in the sample, all the cells for 70-and 80-year-olds are empty, but most cells for younger and middle-aged drivers are filled.
Estimation Results
Table 1 summarizes the dealer gross profit on sale of the vehicle and sale of ancillaries. The means and standard deviations in Table 1 are calculated weighting by transaction counts within cells. The average vehicle gross for all vehicles is $1,497 with averages for particular models ranging from $685 for the Honda Civic LX to $2,868 for the Acura 3.2TL. The standard deviations within models demonstrate the existence of extensive price discrimination. The standard deviations for vehicle gross profit vary from $162 for the Acura 3.2 TL to $1,128 for the Cadillac Deville. The standard deviations are, compared to the means, much larger for the finance reserve and credit life insurance income. The overall mean for life insurance income is $61 in the 243 cells in which the dealer provides financing. But life insurance income is nonzero in only 58 of the 243 cells; when life insurance is sold, the average income equals $185 (suggesting an even higher profit in the transactions where life insurance is sold).
For vehicle gross we consider both a model which allows for different coefficients for men and women and a restricted model that allows vehicle gross to differ between men and women only through a dummy variable. In the unrestricted model, we allow different coefficients for women (s = 1) and men (s = 2): (1) (1) airepresents the fixed effect of each vehicleltrim level and y, represents the change in the fixed effect for modelltrim level when the buyer is a woman. We assume that the error term, eij, is independently distributed but inversely proportional to the number of transactions in cell j and hence estimate via weighted least squares. We also consider a restricted model in which the coefficients are the same for men and women save for a dummy variable for women buyers:
(2) ln(Vehic1e Gross Profitil) + P,Percenrage Low APR,, + p, Cash Sale, + P,ln(Days to Turn,;)
Several specification tests support this second specification for vehicle gross profit over equation (1). First, we estimated equation (1) and the same model with vehicle gross as the dependent variable and tested for differences in the error variances between men and women by regressing the squared residuals on a constant and a dummy variable for women buyers. The null hypothesis that the error variances are the same is accepted easily both when the dependent variable is natural log of vehicle gross ( x 2 = 0.07, df = 1, p = 0.79) and when the dependent variable is vehicle gross ( x 2 = 1.28, df = 1, p = 0.26); we conclude that it is appropriate to combine subsamples of men and women. Second, we apply a specification test for the log versus linear functional form and find that the logarithmic form is superior (William H. Greene, 1997 pp. 459-61) . We estimated equation (1) and an equation similar to (1) but with vehicle gross as the dependent variable. We genegted the differences in predicted values lny-ln(9) fzr inclusion in the linear model and 9 -exp(lny), for inclusion in the log model. Given the null hypothesis that the linear fsctional form is correct, the variable lny-ln(j) should be unimportant when added to the linear equation, but the variable is highly signif&ant (t = 6.88). The variable, 9 -exp(lny), however, is insignificant (t = 0.88) when added to the log equation. Third, we perform a parameter stability test comparing equations (1) and (2). As shown at the bottom of Table 2 , the test indicates it is reasonable to assume that the parameters are the same across the two equations as assumed in the restricted model(F,,,,,, = 1 . 0 6 ,= 0.38). The estimation results for equation (2) are shown in the second column of Table 2 . We emphasize one of the primary findings of this paper: using information from a database of dealer profit information, no evidence can be found that dealers capture significantly higher vehicle gross profits in transactions with women buyers. The point estimate, 0.0191, would suggest that women pay about 1.9 percent more than men do (that is, $29 for the mean vehicle gross profit of $1,497), but the coefficient is insignificant (p = 0.47). There are other reliably measured effects on vehicle gross profit: vehicle gross falls as the percentage of low APR transactions within a cell increases ( p = 0.0 15), and buyers who pay cash or provide their own financing generate significantly less vehicle gross profit (p = 0.009). Further, there is some evidence that price discrimination results in buyers of different ages paying different amounts: 70-to 89-year-olds are estimated to generate 10.6-percent higher vehicle gross compared to 20-to 29-year-olds (p = 0 . 0 8 ) .~ The ln(Days to Turn) variable is insignificant as, apparently, the effect of days in inventory on vehicle gross is largely subsumed in the fixed effects for vehiclesltrim levels.
A unique aspect of our study is that we obtain information on dealer profit from the sale of ancillary services. In 243 of 414 cells Our finding that younger buyers do not generate higher vehicle gross profits for dealers goes against the commonly held view that younger buyers pay more but is in accord with the results of Goldherg (1996) . Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each coefficient. "The degrees of freedom in the numerator are 34 rather than 35 because there is one modelltrim level in which we do not observe cells in which women financed the purchase through the dealer. * Significant at the 5-percent level (two-sided hypothesis test). ** Significant at the 1-percent level (two-sided hypothesis test).
(describing 2,770 of 4,030 transactions) dealers Our regression model for the finance reserve provided financing for the vehicle purchase. One is similar to equations (1) and (2) except that we strategy for analyzing this data would be to select drop the clearly irrelevant Cash Sale variable an estimation technique that addressed explicitly and the logically irrelevant ln(Days to Turn) the left-censoring of the finance reserve. (We do variable. Again, we performed several specifiso in analyzing dealer profit from selling service cation tests. We find no significant difference in contracts and credit life insurance.) But in addition error variances between the subsamples of to observing 171 left-censored zeros for the fiwomen and men for the model having natural nance reserve, we also observe 19 uncensored log of the finance reserve as the dependent zeros-that is, 19 cells (representing 91 transacvariable. There is evidence of higher error varitions) where the dealer financed the purchase but ances for women in the model having finance the finance reserve is zero. To avoid mixing cenreserve as the dependent variable, but the funcsored and uncensored zeros, we analyze the fitional form specification test indicates strongly nance reserve using the same approach as was that the log functional form is superior to the used to model vehicle gross using the 224 cells with positive finance reserve amounts5 serve. We did, however. consider a fixed-effects logit model We did not include the 19 cells with finance reserve (Gary Chamberlain, 1980) to analyze the zero versus posiequal to zero in this regression because no specification tive finance reserve outcome, but no differences between could sensibly incorporate zero values for the finance remen and women were evident. linear form. Finally, for the log model the null hypothesis that parameters are stable between men and women (save for a different intercept for women) is not rejected (F,,,,,, = 1.30, p = 0.15). The final estimation results for the finance reserve are contained in the last column of Table 2. We find no evidence that dealers extract a higher finance reserve from women buyers. The estimates in Table 2 indicate an orderly pattern wherein the finance reserve is highest for the youngest buyers and decreases in each successive age category. Hence, while there is some evidence that 70-to 89-year-old buyers pay more for vehicles ($151 more using given average vehicle gross), they generate lower finance reserves ($185 less given average finance reserve of $452).
In Table 3 we report the results for dealer profit from selling service contracts and life insurance. Service contract income is greater than zero in 70 percent of the cells, but all buyers would have accepted service contracts if the terms were favorable enough. To address this left-censoring we assume a random-effects Tobit model of determination of service contract income: where * indicates the latent value of the natural log of service contract income, and v i represents the error term for modelltrim level i which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation at.
Estimation results, including marginal effects, are given in the second and third columns of Table 3 . The estimates of a , and a, are reported as well. There is no indication that women generate higher service contract income for dealers; the point estimate is negative (suggesting 30-percent lower service contract income for women) but insignificant ( z = -1.06, p = 0.29). The results indicate that buyers who pay cash or arrange for outside financing generate much less service contract income ( z = 5.59). The pattern by age category changes again: middle-aged buyers generate more service contract income than the youngest and oldest buyers.
A similar pattern emerges for credit life insurance income. For life insurance income we use the same specification as in (3), but we use only the cells where the dealer provides financing as there is no opportunity to sell the insurance if the customer does not borrow through the dealer. We are forced to drop all observations for 70-to 89-year-olds and for several model/trim levels because we observe no instances where a buyer purchases credit life insurance income. One or more buyers purchased credit life insurance in 33.7 percent of the remaining 172 cells. The results, shown in the last two columns of Table 3 , provide no evidence that women generate more credit life insurance income. Again, there is evidence that the middle-aged buyers generate more life insurance income than the youngest and oldest buyers.
Conclusion
Heretofore there has been mixed evidence on whether price discrimination by new vehicle dealers results in women and minorities paying systematically more for new vehicles. Ayres and Siegelman (1995) performed a careful paired-audit study and found that white women and black men and women received higher initial and final offers from new vehicle dealers (with the effect being statistically significant for minority buyers but insignificant for white female buyers). Goldberg (1996) examined data from the CES and found no evidence that minorities or white females received smaller discounts. Both studies are subject to criticism: Ayres and Siegelman observe offers, not transactions. Goldberg is forced to measure discounts from the suggested retail price rather than the preferable dealer markup or profit, has to drop many observations because of missing data in the CES, and does not directly observe trim level and additional options. ** Significant at the I-percent level (two-sided hypothesis test).
Our study addresses the question of whether women pay more for new vehicles, but is silent on whether minorities pay more. We examine data from a new J.D. Power and Associates database which comes directly from dealers' financial computer software programs and yields information on vehicle gross profit and profit from sales of ancillary products. The contemporaneously collected transaction information reveals that new vehicle dealers engage in extensive price discrimination: The standard deviation for vehicle gross profit is as high as $1,128 for a Cadillac Deville (which has an average vehicle gross profit of $2,506). Price discrimination is in evidence by age-group: Older buyers appear to generate higher vehicle gross profit, but lower profits from the sale of ancillaries. Middle-aged buyers generate higher profits for the dealer in the sales of service contracts and credit life insurance. In addition, buyers who pay cash or arrange their own financing generate significantly lower gross vehicle profits and service contract income. So while we find a great deal of evidence suggesting dealers attempt first-degree price discrimination, we find no reliable evidence that the attempt at price discrimination results in women paying significantly more for vehicles or ancillary services.
